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# MSC0000: Web Push pusher kind | ||
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As stated in MSC3013: | ||
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Push notifications have the problem that they typically go through third-party gateways in order to | ||
be delivered, e.g. FCM (Google) or APNs (Apple) and an app-specific gateway (sygnal). In order to | ||
prevent these push gateways from being able to read any sensitive information the `event_id_only` format | ||
was introduced, which only pushes the `event_id` and `room_id` of an event down the push. After | ||
receiving the push message the client can hit the `GET /_matrix/client/r0/rooms/{roomId}/event/{eventId}` | ||
to fetch the full event, and then create the notification based on that. | ||
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Even the `event_id_only` leaks some metadata that can be avoided. | ||
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Today, web clients (eg. hydrogen, probably element web/desktop), needs to use a matrix to webpush gateway. | ||
This requires goind over the specifications, because they use `endpoint`, and `auth` in the `PusherData` | ||
(hydrogen [1], sygnal [2]), while the specifications let understand that only `url` and `format` are allowed [3]. | ||
=> __PusherData already need to be updated__ to add `auth` and `endpoint`. | ||
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Web Push is a standard for (E2EE) push notifications, defined with RFC8030+RFC8291+RFC8292: many libraries | ||
are already available and robuste: they are reviewed, and acknowledge by experts. | ||
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Having a webpush push kind would provide push notifications without gateway to | ||
- Web app and desktop app | ||
- Android apps using UnifiedPush (MSC2970 was open for this and won't be required anymore) | ||
- Maybe other ? We have seen apple moving a lot into web push support | ||
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[1] https://github.com/element-hq/hydrogen-web/blob/9b68f30aad329c003ead70ff43f289e293efb8e0/src/platform/web/dom/NotificationService.js#L32 | ||
[2] https://github.com/matrix-org/sygnal/blob/main/sygnal/webpushpushkin.py#L152 | ||
[3] https://spec.matrix.org/v1.9/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3pushersset (search for PusherData) | ||
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## Proposal | ||
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`PusherData` fields are now define as follow: | ||
- `format`: Required if `kind` is `http` or `webpush`, not used if `kind` is `email`. The format to send | ||
notifications in to Push Gateways. The details about what fields the homeserver should send to the push gateway | ||
are defined in the Push Gateway Specification. Currently the only format available is ’event_id_only'. | ||
- `url`: Required if `kind` is `http`, not used else. The URL to use to send notifications to. MUST be an | ||
HTTPS URL with a path of /_matrix/push/v1/notify | ||
- `endpoint`: Required if `kind` is `webpush`, not used else. The URL to send notification to, as defined as a | ||
`push resource` by RFC8030. MUST be an HTTPS URL. | ||
- `auth`: Required if `kind` is `webpush`, not used else. The authentication secret. This is 16 random bytes | ||
encoded in base64 url. | ||
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The POST request to the endpoint dedicated to the creation, modification and deletin of pushers, | ||
`POST /_matrix/client/v3/pushers/set` now supports a new `kind`: `webpush`. | ||
- `kind`: Required: The `kind` of pusher to configure. `http` makes a pusher that sends HTTP pokes. `webpush` makes a | ||
pusher that sends Web Push encrypted messages. `email` makes a pusher that emails the user with unread notifications. | ||
`null` deletes the pusher. | ||
- `pushkey`: Required: This is a unique identifier for this pusher. The value you should use for this is the routing | ||
or destination address information for the notification, for example, the APNS token for APNS or the Registration ID | ||
for GCM. If your notification client has no such concept, use any unique identifier. Max length, 512 bytes. | ||
If the `kind` is "email", this is the email address to send notifications to. | ||
If the `kind` is `webpush`, this is the user agent public key encoded in base64 url. The public key comes from a ECDH | ||
keypair using the P-256 (prime256v1, cf. FIPS186) curve. | ||
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## Potential issues | ||
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While implemnting, one have to be carreful with RFC8291: many libraries use the 4th draft of this spec. Checking the | ||
Content-Encoding header is a good way to know if it the correct version. If the value is `aes128gcm`, then it uses | ||
the right specifications, else (`aesgcm`), then it uses the draft version. | ||
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## Alternatives | ||
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`pushkey` could be a random ID, and we can add `p256dh` in the `PusherData`. But it would require client to store it, | ||
while the public key already identify that pusher. And, client already use the PusherData that way. | ||
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## Security considerations | ||
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Security considerations are listed by RFC8030 [4], there are mainly resolved with RFC8291 (Encryption) and | ||
RFC8292 (VAPID). | ||
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Like any other federation request, there is a risk of SSRF. This risk is limited since the post data isn't | ||
arbitrary (the content is encrypted), and a potential malicious actor don't have access to the response. | ||
Nevertheless, it is recommended to not post to private addresses, with the possibility with a setting to | ||
whitelist a private IP. (Synapse already have ip_range_whitelist [5]) | ||
It is also recommended to not follow redirection, to avoid implementationissue where the destination is check | ||
before sending the request but not for redirections. | ||
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Like any other federation request, there is a risk of DOS amplification. One malicious actor register many users | ||
to a valid endpoint, then change the DNS record and target another server, then notify all these users. This | ||
amplification is very limited since HTTPS is required and the TLS certificate of the target will be rejected. The | ||
request won't reach any functionnality of the targeted application. The home server can reject pusher if the response | ||
code is not one intended. | ||
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[4] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8030#section-8 | ||
[5] https://matrix-org.github.io/synapse/latest/usage/configuration/config_documentation.html#ip_range_whitelist | ||
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## Unstable prefix | ||
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- | ||
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## Dependencies | ||
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- | ||
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