diff --git a/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.html b/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.html
index 840ab08..c06423e 100644
--- a/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.html
+++ b/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.html
@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@
 </tr></thead>
 <tfoot><tr>
 <td class="left">Thomson</td>
-<td class="center">Expires 16 September 2024</td>
+<td class="center">Expires 17 September 2024</td>
 <td class="right">[Page]</td>
 </tr></tfoot>
 </table>
@@ -1047,12 +1047,12 @@
 <dd class="internet-draft">draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile-latest</dd>
 <dt class="label-published">Published:</dt>
 <dd class="published">
-<time datetime="2024-03-15" class="published">15 March 2024</time>
+<time datetime="2024-03-16" class="published">16 March 2024</time>
     </dd>
 <dt class="label-intended-status">Intended Status:</dt>
 <dd class="intended-status">Informational</dd>
 <dt class="label-expires">Expires:</dt>
-<dd class="expires"><time datetime="2024-09-16">16 September 2024</time></dd>
+<dd class="expires"><time datetime="2024-09-17">17 September 2024</time></dd>
 <dt class="label-authors">Author:</dt>
 <dd class="authors">
 <div class="author">
@@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ <h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo">
         time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
         material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-4">
-        This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 September 2024.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
+        This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 September 2024.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 </section>
 </div>
 <div id="copyright">
@@ -1413,14 +1413,14 @@ <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
 access to these capabilities.<a href="#section-3-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 <p id="section-3-6">Forward secrecy guarantees provided in TLS 1.3 (see Section <a href="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-1.2" class="relref">1.2</a> and Appendix <a href="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#appendix-E.1" class="relref">E.1</a> of <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="cite xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>) and some modes of TLS 1.2 (such as those in Sections <a href="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492#section-2.2" class="relref">2.2</a> and <a href="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492#section-2.4" class="relref">2.4</a> of <span>[<a href="#RFC4492" class="cite xref">RFC4492</a>]</span>) do not hold if key material is recorded.  Access to key
 material allows an attacker to decrypt data exchanged in any logged TLS
-connections.
-Logging the TLS 1.2 "master" secret provides the recipient of that secret far
+connections.<a href="#section-3-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
+<p id="section-3-7">Logging the TLS 1.2 "master" secret provides the recipient of that secret far
 greater access to an active connection than TLS 1.3 secrets.  In addition to
 reading and altering protected messages, the TLS 1.2 "master" secret confers the
 ability to resume the connection and impersonate either endpoint, insert records
 that result in renegotiation, and forge Finished messages.  Implementations can
 avoid the risks associated with these capabilities by not logging this secret
-value.<a href="#section-3-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
+value.<a href="#section-3-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 </section>
 </div>
 <div id="iana-considerations">
diff --git a/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.txt b/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.txt
index d329846..abf7d00 100644
--- a/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.txt
+++ b/fs-break/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile.txt
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
 
 Transport Layer Security                                      M. Thomson
 Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
-Intended status: Informational                             15 March 2024
-Expires: 16 September 2024
+Intended status: Informational                             16 March 2024
+Expires: 17 September 2024
 
 
                     The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Status of This Memo
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 September 2024.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 September 2024.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
@@ -297,14 +297,16 @@ Table of Contents
    Appendix E.1 of [RFC8446]) and some modes of TLS 1.2 (such as those
    in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of [RFC4492]) do not hold if key material is
    recorded.  Access to key material allows an attacker to decrypt data
-   exchanged in any logged TLS connections.  Logging the TLS 1.2
-   "master" secret provides the recipient of that secret far greater
-   access to an active connection than TLS 1.3 secrets.  In addition to
-   reading and altering protected messages, the TLS 1.2 "master" secret
-   confers the ability to resume the connection and impersonate either
-   endpoint, insert records that result in renegotiation, and forge
-   Finished messages.  Implementations can avoid the risks associated
-   with these capabilities by not logging this secret value.
+   exchanged in any logged TLS connections.
+
+   Logging the TLS 1.2 "master" secret provides the recipient of that
+   secret far greater access to an active connection than TLS 1.3
+   secrets.  In addition to reading and altering protected messages, the
+   TLS 1.2 "master" secret confers the ability to resume the connection
+   and impersonate either endpoint, insert records that result in
+   renegotiation, and forge Finished messages.  Implementations can
+   avoid the risks associated with these capabilities by not logging
+   this secret value.
 
 4.  IANA Considerations