-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 51
/
Copy pathProject Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel.html
2586 lines (2476 loc) · 573 KB
/
Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel.html
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- saved from url=(0086)https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html -->
<html class="v2" dir="ltr"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<link href="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/2437439463-css_bundle_v2.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
<meta content="width=1100" name="viewport">
<meta content="blogger" name="generator">
<link href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/favicon.ico" rel="icon" type="image/x-icon">
<link href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html" rel="canonical">
<link rel="alternate" type="application/atom+xml" title="Project Zero - Atom" href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default">
<link rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml" title="Project Zero - RSS" href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default?alt=rss">
<link rel="service.post" type="application/atom+xml" title="Project Zero - Atom" href="https://www.blogger.com/feeds/4838136820032157985/posts/default">
<link rel="alternate" type="application/atom+xml" title="Project Zero - Atom" href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/feeds/6227737444967092885/comments/default">
<!--[if IE]><script type="text/javascript" src="https://www.blogger.com/static/v1/jsbin/3061962209-ieretrofit.js"></script>
<![endif]-->
<link href="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/image3.png" rel="image_src">
<meta content="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html" property="og:url">
<meta content="Reading privileged memory with a side-channel" property="og:title">
<meta content=" Posted by Jann Horn, Project Zero We have discovered that CPU data cache timing can be abused to efficiently leak information out of mi..." property="og:description">
<meta content="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-64YRnkgMujY/Wk064WtrSRI/AAAAAAAACPg/O4ZxlUiWerACL61P490xrVMWSmHTwQflQCEwYBhgL/w1200-h630-p-k-no-nu/image3.png" property="og:image">
<!--[if IE]> <script> (function() { var html5 = ("abbr,article,aside,audio,canvas,datalist,details," + "figure,footer,header,hgroup,mark,menu,meter,nav,output," + "progress,section,time,video").split(','); for (var i = 0; i < html5.length; i++) { document.createElement(html5[i]); } try { document.execCommand('BackgroundImageCache', false, true); } catch(e) {} })(); </script> <![endif]-->
<title>Project Zero: Reading privileged memory with a side-channel</title>
<style type="text/css">@font-face{font-family:'Open Sans';font-style:normal;font-weight:400;src:local('Open Sans Regular'),local('OpenSans-Regular'),url(//fonts.gstatic.com/s/opensans/v15/cJZKeOuBrn4kERxqtaUH3aCWcynf_cDxXwCLxiixG1c.ttf)format('truetype');}</style>
<style id="page-skin-1" type="text/css"><!--
/*
-----------------------------------------------
Blogger Template Style
Name: Simple
Designer: Blogger
URL: www.blogger.com
----------------------------------------------- */
/* Content
----------------------------------------------- */
body {
font: normal normal 12px Open Sans;
color: #666666;
background: #eeeeee none repeat scroll top left;
padding: 0 0 0 0;
}
html body .region-inner {
min-width: 0;
max-width: 100%;
width: auto;
}
h2 {
font-size: 22px;
}
a:link {
text-decoration:none;
color: #2288bb;
}
a:visited {
text-decoration:none;
color: #888888;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration:underline;
color: #33aaff;
}
.body-fauxcolumn-outer .fauxcolumn-inner {
background: transparent none repeat scroll top left;
_background-image: none;
}
.body-fauxcolumn-outer .cap-top {
position: absolute;
z-index: 1;
height: 400px;
width: 100%;
}
.body-fauxcolumn-outer .cap-top .cap-left {
width: 100%;
background: transparent none repeat-x scroll top left;
_background-image: none;
}
.content-outer {
-moz-box-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .15);
-webkit-box-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .15);
-goog-ms-box-shadow: 0 0 0 #333333;
box-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .15);
margin-bottom: 1px;
}
.content-inner {
padding: 10px 40px;
}
.content-inner {
background-color: #ffffff;
}
/* Header
----------------------------------------------- */
.header-outer {
background: transparent none repeat-x scroll 0 -400px;
_background-image: none;
}
.Header h1 {
font: normal normal 40px Open Sans;
color: #000000;
text-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .2);
}
.Header h1 a {
color: #000000;
}
.Header .description {
font-size: 18px;
color: #000000;
}
.header-inner .Header .titlewrapper {
padding: 22px 0;
}
.header-inner .Header .descriptionwrapper {
padding: 0 0;
}
/* Tabs
----------------------------------------------- */
.tabs-inner .section:first-child {
border-top: 0 solid #dddddd;
}
.tabs-inner .section:first-child ul {
margin-top: -1px;
border-top: 1px solid #dddddd;
border-left: 1px solid #dddddd;
border-right: 1px solid #dddddd;
}
.tabs-inner .widget ul {
background: transparent none repeat-x scroll 0 -800px;
_background-image: none;
border-bottom: 1px solid #dddddd;
margin-top: 0;
margin-left: -30px;
margin-right: -30px;
}
.tabs-inner .widget li a {
display: inline-block;
padding: .6em 1em;
font: normal normal 12px Open Sans;
color: #000000;
border-left: 1px solid #ffffff;
border-right: 1px solid #dddddd;
}
.tabs-inner .widget li:first-child a {
border-left: none;
}
.tabs-inner .widget li.selected a, .tabs-inner .widget li a:hover {
color: #000000;
background-color: #eeeeee;
text-decoration: none;
}
/* Columns
----------------------------------------------- */
.main-outer {
border-top: 0 solid transparent;
}
.fauxcolumn-left-outer .fauxcolumn-inner {
border-right: 1px solid transparent;
}
.fauxcolumn-right-outer .fauxcolumn-inner {
border-left: 1px solid transparent;
}
/* Headings
----------------------------------------------- */
div.widget > h2,
div.widget h2.title {
margin: 0 0 1em 0;
font: normal bold 11px 'Trebuchet MS',Trebuchet,Verdana,sans-serif;
color: #000000;
}
/* Widgets
----------------------------------------------- */
.widget .zippy {
color: #999999;
text-shadow: 2px 2px 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
}
.widget .popular-posts ul {
list-style: none;
}
/* Posts
----------------------------------------------- */
h2.date-header {
font: normal bold 11px Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif;
}
.date-header span {
background-color: #bbbbbb;
color: #ffffff;
padding: 0.4em;
letter-spacing: 3px;
margin: inherit;
}
.main-inner {
padding-top: 35px;
padding-bottom: 65px;
}
.main-inner .column-center-inner {
padding: 0 0;
}
.main-inner .column-center-inner .section {
margin: 0 1em;
}
.post {
margin: 0 0 45px 0;
}
h3.post-title, .comments h4 {
font: normal normal 22px Open Sans;
margin: .75em 0 0;
}
.post-body {
font-size: 110%;
line-height: 1.4;
position: relative;
}
.post-body img, .post-body .tr-caption-container, .Profile img, .Image img,
.BlogList .item-thumbnail img {
padding: 2px;
background: #ffffff;
border: 1px solid #eeeeee;
-moz-box-shadow: 1px 1px 5px rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
-webkit-box-shadow: 1px 1px 5px rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
box-shadow: 1px 1px 5px rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
}
.post-body img, .post-body .tr-caption-container {
padding: 5px;
}
.post-body .tr-caption-container {
color: #666666;
}
.post-body .tr-caption-container img {
padding: 0;
background: transparent;
border: none;
-moz-box-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
-webkit-box-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
box-shadow: 0 0 0 rgba(0, 0, 0, .1);
}
.post-header {
margin: 0 0 1.5em;
line-height: 1.6;
font-size: 90%;
}
.post-footer {
margin: 20px -2px 0;
padding: 5px 10px;
color: #666666;
background-color: #eeeeee;
border-bottom: 1px solid #eeeeee;
line-height: 1.6;
font-size: 90%;
}
#comments .comment-author {
padding-top: 1.5em;
border-top: 1px solid transparent;
background-position: 0 1.5em;
}
#comments .comment-author:first-child {
padding-top: 0;
border-top: none;
}
.avatar-image-container {
margin: .2em 0 0;
}
#comments .avatar-image-container img {
border: 1px solid #eeeeee;
}
/* Comments
----------------------------------------------- */
.comments .comments-content .icon.blog-author {
background-repeat: no-repeat;
background-image: url();
}
.comments .comments-content .loadmore a {
border-top: 1px solid #999999;
border-bottom: 1px solid #999999;
}
.comments .comment-thread.inline-thread {
background-color: #eeeeee;
}
.comments .continue {
border-top: 2px solid #999999;
}
/* Accents
---------------------------------------------- */
.section-columns td.columns-cell {
border-left: 1px solid transparent;
}
.blog-pager {
background: transparent url(//www.blogblog.com/1kt/simple/paging_dot.png) repeat-x scroll top center;
}
.blog-pager-older-link, .home-link,
.blog-pager-newer-link {
background-color: #ffffff;
padding: 5px;
}
.footer-outer {
border-top: 1px dashed #bbbbbb;
}
/* Mobile
----------------------------------------------- */
body.mobile {
background-size: auto;
}
.mobile .body-fauxcolumn-outer {
background: transparent none repeat scroll top left;
}
.mobile .body-fauxcolumn-outer .cap-top {
background-size: 100% auto;
}
.mobile .content-outer {
-webkit-box-shadow: 0 0 3px rgba(0, 0, 0, .15);
box-shadow: 0 0 3px rgba(0, 0, 0, .15);
}
.mobile .tabs-inner .widget ul {
margin-left: 0;
margin-right: 0;
}
.mobile .post {
margin: 0;
}
.mobile .main-inner .column-center-inner .section {
margin: 0;
}
.mobile .date-header span {
padding: 0.1em 10px;
margin: 0 -10px;
}
.mobile h3.post-title {
margin: 0;
}
.mobile .blog-pager {
background: transparent none no-repeat scroll top center;
}
.mobile .footer-outer {
border-top: none;
}
.mobile .main-inner, .mobile .footer-inner {
background-color: #ffffff;
}
.mobile-index-contents {
color: #666666;
}
.mobile-link-button {
background-color: #2288bb;
}
.mobile-link-button a:link, .mobile-link-button a:visited {
color: #ffffff;
}
.mobile .tabs-inner .section:first-child {
border-top: none;
}
.mobile .tabs-inner .PageList .widget-content {
background-color: #eeeeee;
color: #000000;
border-top: 1px solid #dddddd;
border-bottom: 1px solid #dddddd;
}
.mobile .tabs-inner .PageList .widget-content .pagelist-arrow {
border-left: 1px solid #dddddd;
}
--></style>
<style id="template-skin-1" type="text/css"><!--
body {
min-width: 1120px;
}
.content-outer, .content-fauxcolumn-outer, .region-inner {
min-width: 1120px;
max-width: 1120px;
_width: 1120px;
}
.main-inner .columns {
padding-left: 0;
padding-right: 310px;
}
.main-inner .fauxcolumn-center-outer {
left: 0;
right: 310px;
/* IE6 does not respect left and right together */
_width: expression(this.parentNode.offsetWidth -
parseInt("0") -
parseInt("310px") + 'px');
}
.main-inner .fauxcolumn-left-outer {
width: 0;
}
.main-inner .fauxcolumn-right-outer {
width: 310px;
}
.main-inner .column-left-outer {
width: 0;
right: 100%;
margin-left: -0;
}
.main-inner .column-right-outer {
width: 310px;
margin-right: -310px;
}
#layout {
min-width: 0;
}
#layout .content-outer {
min-width: 0;
width: 800px;
}
#layout .region-inner {
min-width: 0;
width: auto;
}
body#layout div.add_widget {
padding: 8px;
}
body#layout div.add_widget a {
margin-left: 32px;
}
--></style>
<link href="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/authorization.css" media="all" onload="if(media!='all')media='all'" rel="stylesheet"><noscript><link href='https://www.blogger.com/dyn-css/authorization.css?targetBlogID=4838136820032157985&amp;zx=253ba9da-9da4-4788-be8e-07bc312af673' rel='stylesheet'/></noscript>
<script src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/cb=gapi.loaded_4" async=""></script><script src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/cb=gapi.loaded_3" async=""></script><script src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/cb=gapi.loaded_2" async=""></script><script type="text/javascript" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/google_top_exp.js"></script><style>.gc-bubbleDefault{background-color:transparent !important;text-align:left;padding:0 !important;margin:0 !important;border:0 !important;table-layout:auto !important}.gc-reset{background-color:transparent !important;border:0 !important;padding:0 !important;margin:0 !important;text-align:left}.pls-bubbleTop{border-bottom:1px solid #ccc !important}.pls-topTail,.pls-vertShimLeft,.pls-contentLeft{background-image:url(//ssl.gstatic.com/s2/oz/images/stars/po/bubblev1/border_3.gif) !important}.pls-topTail{background-repeat:repeat-x !important;background-position:bottom !important}.pls-vertShim{background-color:#fff !important;text-align:right}.tbl-grey .pls-vertShim{background-color:#f5f5f5 !important}.pls-vertShimLeft{background-repeat:repeat-y !important;background-position:right !important;height:4px}.pls-vertShimRight{height:4px}.pls-confirm-container .pls-vertShim{background-color:#fff3c2 !important}.pls-contentWrap{background-color:#fff !important;position:relative !important;vertical-align:top}.pls-contentLeft{background-repeat:repeat-y;background-position:right;vertical-align:top}.pls-dropRight{background-image:url(//ssl.gstatic.com/s2/oz/images/stars/po/bubblev1/bubbleDropR_3.png) !important;background-repeat:repeat-y !important;vertical-align:top}.pls-vert,.pls-tailleft,.pls-dropTR .pls-dropBR,.pls-dropBL,.pls-vert img{vertical-align:top}.pls-dropBottom{background-image:url(//ssl.gstatic.com/s2/oz/images/stars/po/bubblev1/bubbleDropB_3.png) !important;background-repeat:repeat-x !important;width:100%;vertical-align:top}.pls-topLeft{background:inherit !important;text-align:right;vertical-align:bottom}.pls-topRight{background:inherit !important;text-align:left;vertical-align:bottom}.pls-bottomLeft{background:inherit !important;text-align:right}.pls-bottomRight{background:inherit !important;text-align:left;vertical-align:top}.pls-tailtop,.pls-tailright,.pls-tailbottom,.pls-tailleft{display:none;position:relative}.pls-tailbottom,.pls-tailtop,.pls-tailright,.pls-tailleft,.pls-dropTR,.pls-dropBR,.pls-dropBL{background-image:url(//ssl.gstatic.com/s2/oz/images/stars/po/bubblev1/bubbleSprite_3.png) !important;background-repeat:no-repeat}.tbl-grey .pls-tailbottom,.tbl-grey .pls-tailtop,.tbl-grey .pls-tailright,.tbl-grey .pls-tailleft,.tbl-grey .pls-dropTR,.tbl-grey .pls-dropBR,.tbl-grey .pls-dropBL{background-image:url(//ssl.gstatic.com/s2/oz/images/stars/po/bubblev1/bubbleSprite-grey.png) !important}.pls-tailbottom{background-position:-23px 0}.pls-confirm-container .pls-tailbottom{background-position:-23px -10px}.pls-tailtop{background-position:-19px -20px}.pls-tailright{background-position:0 0}.pls-tailleft{background-position:-10px 0}.pls-tailtop{vertical-align:top}.gc-bubbleDefault td{line-height:0;font-size:0}.pls-topLeft img,.pls-topRight img,.pls-tailbottom{vertical-align:bottom}.pls-bottomLeft img,.bubbleDropTR,.pls-dropBottomL img,.pls-dropBottom img,.pls-dropBottomR img,.pls-bottomLeft{vertical-align:top}.pls-dropTR{background-position:0 -22px}.pls-dropBR{background-position:0 -27px}.pls-dropBL{background-position:0 -16px}.pls-spacertop,.pls-spacerright,.pls-spacerbottom,.pls-spacerleft{position:static !important}.pls-spinner{bottom:0;position:absolute;left:0;margin:auto;right:0;top:0} </style><script async="" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/lazy.min.js"></script></head>
<body class=" variant-simplysimple">
<div class="navbar section" id="navbar" name="Navbar"><div class="widget Navbar" data-version="1" id="Navbar1"><script src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/cb=gapi.loaded_1" async=""></script><script src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/cb=gapi(1).loaded_0" async=""></script><script type="text/javascript">
function setAttributeOnload(object, attribute, val) {
if(window.addEventListener) {
window.addEventListener('load',
function(){ object[attribute] = val; }, false);
} else {
window.attachEvent('onload', function(){ object[attribute] = val; });
}
}
</script>
<div id="navbar-iframe-container"><iframe ng-non-bindable="" frameborder="0" hspace="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" style="" tabindex="0" vspace="0" width="100%" id="navbar-iframe" name="navbar-iframe" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/navbar.html"></iframe></div>
<script type="text/javascript" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/plusone.js" gapi_processed="true"></script>
<script type="text/javascript">
gapi.load("gapi.iframes:gapi.iframes.style.bubble", function() {
if (gapi.iframes && gapi.iframes.getContext) {
gapi.iframes.getContext().openChild({
url: 'https://www.blogger.com/navbar.g?targetBlogID\x3d4838136820032157985\x26blogName\x3dProject+Zero\x26publishMode\x3dPUBLISH_MODE_BLOGSPOT\x26navbarType\x3dLIGHT\x26layoutType\x3dLAYOUTS\x26searchRoot\x3dhttps://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/search\x26blogLocale\x3den\x26v\x3d2\x26homepageUrl\x3dhttps://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/\x26targetPostID\x3d6227737444967092885\x26blogPostOrPageUrl\x3dhttps://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html\x26vt\x3d-3982583195641882669',
where: document.getElementById("navbar-iframe-container"),
id: "navbar-iframe"
});
}
});
</script><script type="text/javascript">
(function() {
var script = document.createElement('script');
script.type = 'text/javascript';
script.src = '//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/google_top_exp.js';
var head = document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0];
if (head) {
head.appendChild(script);
}})();
</script>
</div></div>
<div class="body-fauxcolumns">
<div class="fauxcolumn-outer body-fauxcolumn-outer">
<div class="cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-inner">
</div>
</div>
<div class="cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="content">
<div class="content-fauxcolumns">
<div class="fauxcolumn-outer content-fauxcolumn-outer">
<div class="cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-inner">
</div>
</div>
<div class="cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="content-outer">
<div class="content-cap-top cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left content-fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right content-fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="content-inner">
<header>
<div class="header-outer">
<div class="header-cap-top cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left header-fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right header-fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="region-inner header-inner">
<div class="header section" id="header" name="Header"><div class="widget Header" data-version="1" id="Header1">
<div id="header-inner">
<div class="titlewrapper">
<h1 class="title">
<a href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/">
Project Zero
</a>
</h1>
</div>
<div class="descriptionwrapper">
<p class="description"><span>News and updates from the Project Zero team at Google</span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="header-cap-bottom cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
</header>
<div class="tabs-outer">
<div class="tabs-cap-top cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left tabs-fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right tabs-fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="region-inner tabs-inner">
<div class="tabs no-items section" id="crosscol" name="Cross-Column"></div>
<div class="tabs no-items section" id="crosscol-overflow" name="Cross-Column 2"></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="tabs-cap-bottom cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="main-outer">
<div class="main-cap-top cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left main-fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right main-fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="region-inner main-inner">
<div class="columns fauxcolumns">
<div class="fauxcolumn-outer fauxcolumn-center-outer">
<div class="cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-inner">
</div>
</div>
<div class="cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-outer fauxcolumn-left-outer">
<div class="cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-inner">
</div>
</div>
<div class="cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-outer fauxcolumn-right-outer">
<div class="cap-top">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
<div class="fauxborder-left">
<div class="fauxborder-right"></div>
<div class="fauxcolumn-inner">
</div>
</div>
<div class="cap-bottom">
<div class="cap-left"></div>
<div class="cap-right"></div>
</div>
</div>
<!-- corrects IE6 width calculation -->
<div class="columns-inner">
<div class="column-center-outer">
<div class="column-center-inner">
<div class="main section" id="main" name="Main"><div class="widget Blog" data-version="1" id="Blog1">
<div class="blog-posts hfeed">
<div class="date-outer">
<h2 class="date-header"><span>Wednesday, January 3, 2018</span></h2>
<div class="date-posts">
<div class="post-outer">
<div class="post hentry uncustomized-post-template" itemprop="blogPost" itemscope="itemscope" itemtype="http://schema.org/BlogPosting">
<meta content="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-64YRnkgMujY/Wk064WtrSRI/AAAAAAAACPg/O4ZxlUiWerACL61P490xrVMWSmHTwQflQCEwYBhgL/s640/image3.png" itemprop="image_url">
<meta content="4838136820032157985" itemprop="blogId">
<meta content="6227737444967092885" itemprop="postId">
<a name="6227737444967092885"></a>
<h3 class="post-title entry-title" itemprop="name">
Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
</h3>
<div class="post-header">
<div class="post-header-line-1"></div>
</div>
<div class="post-body entry-content" id="post-body-6227737444967092885" itemprop="description articleBody">
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Posted by Jann Horn, Project Zero</span></div>
<b id="docs-internal-guid-c66856d3-bdac-1e12-91fc-544573d27dc6" style="font-weight: normal;"><br></b>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">We have discovered that CPU data cache timing can be abused to efficiently leak information out of mis-speculated execution, leading to (at worst) arbitrary virtual memory read vulnerabilities across local security boundaries in various contexts.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Variants of this issue are known to affect many modern processors, including certain processors by Intel, AMD and ARM. For a few Intel and AMD CPU models, we have exploits that work against real software. We reported this issue to Intel, AMD and ARM on 2017-06-01 [1]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">So far, there are three known variants of the issue:</span></div>
<br>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Variant 1: bounds check bypass (</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10.5pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">CVE-2017-5753)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Variant 2: branch target injection (</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10.5pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">CVE-2017-5715)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Variant 3: rogue data cache load (</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10.5pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">CVE-2017-5754)</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; ">Before the issues described here were publicly disclosed, Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Yuval Yarom, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Michael Schwarz, Mike Hamburg, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher and Werner Haas also reported them; their [writeups/blogposts/paper drafts] are at:</span></div>
<br>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; "><a href="https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf">Spectre</a> (variants 1 and 2)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; "><a href="https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf">Meltdown</a> (variant 3)</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">During the course of our research, we developed the following proofs of concept (PoCs):</span></div>
<br>
<ol style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: decimal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A PoC that demonstrates the basic principles behind variant 1 in userspace on the tested Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, the AMD FX CPU, the AMD PRO CPU and an ARM Cortex A57 [2].</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> This PoC only tests for the ability to read data inside mis-speculated execution within the same process, without crossing any privilege boundaries.</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: decimal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A PoC for variant 1 that, when running with normal user privileges under a modern Linux kernel with a distro-standard config, can perform arbitrary reads in a 4GiB range [3]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> in kernel virtual memory on the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU. If the kernel's BPF JIT is enabled (non-default configuration), it also works on the AMD PRO CPU. On the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, kernel virtual memory can be read at a rate of around 2000 bytes per second after around 4 seconds of startup time. [4]</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: decimal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A PoC for variant 2 that, when running with root privileges inside a KVM guest created using virt-manager on the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, with a specific (now outdated) version of Debian's distro kernel</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> [5] running on the host, can read host kernel memory at a rate of around 1500 bytes/second, with room for optimization. Before the attack can be performed, some initialization has to be performed that takes roughly between 10 and 30 minutes for a machine with 64GiB of RAM; the needed time should scale roughly linearly with the amount of host RAM. (If 2MB hugepages are available to the guest, the initialization should be much faster, but that hasn't been tested.)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: decimal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A PoC for variant 3 that, when running with normal user privileges, can read kernel memory on the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU under some precondition. We believe that this precondition is that the targeted kernel memory is present in the L1D cache.</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">For interesting resources around this topic, look down into the "Literature" section.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A warning regarding explanations about processor internals in this blogpost: This blogpost contains a lot of speculation about hardware internals based on observed behavior, which might not necessarily correspond to what processors are actually doing.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">We have some ideas on possible mitigations and provided some of those ideas to the processor vendors; however, we believe that the processor vendors are in a much better position than we are to design and evaluate mitigations, and we expect them to be the source of authoritative guidance.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The PoC code and the writeups that we sent to the CPU vendors are available here: <a href="https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1272">https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1272</a>.</span></div>
<h1 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 20pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 20pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Tested Processors</span></h1>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-1650 v3 @ 3.50GHz (called "Intel Haswell Xeon CPU" in the rest of this document)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">AMD FX(tm)-8320 Eight-Core Processor (called "AMD FX CPU" in the rest of this document)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">AMD PRO A8-9600 R7, 10 COMPUTE CORES 4C+6G (called "AMD PRO CPU" in the rest of this document)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">An ARM Cortex A57 core of a Google Nexus 5x phone [6]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 10pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> (called "ARM Cortex A57" in the rest of this document)</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 20pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 20pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Glossary</span></h1>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">retire:</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> An instruction retires when its results, e.g. register writes and memory writes, are committed and made visible to the rest of the system. Instructions can be executed out of order, but must always retire in order.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">logical processor core:</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> A logical processor core is what the operating system sees as a processor core. With hyperthreading enabled, the number of logical cores is a multiple of the number of physical cores.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">cached/uncached data:</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> In this blogpost, "uncached" data is data that is only present in main memory, not in any of the cache levels of the CPU. Loading uncached data will typically take over 100 cycles of CPU time.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">speculative execution:</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> A processor can execute past a branch without knowing whether it will be taken or where its target is, therefore executing instructions before it is known whether they should be executed. If this speculation turns out to have been incorrect, the CPU can discard the resulting state without architectural effects and continue execution on the correct execution path. Instructions do not retire before it is known that they are on the correct execution path.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">mis-speculation window:</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> The time window during which the CPU speculatively executes the wrong code and has not yet detected that mis-speculation has occurred.</span></div>
<h1 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 20pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 20pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Variant 1: Bounds check bypass</span></h1>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This section explains the common theory behind all three variants and the theory behind our PoC for variant 1 that, when running in userspace under a Debian distro kernel, can perform arbitrary reads in a 4GiB region of kernel memory in at least the following configurations:</span></div>
<br>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, eBPF JIT is off (default state)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, eBPF JIT is on (non-default state)</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">AMD PRO CPU, eBPF JIT is on (non-default state)</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The state of the eBPF JIT can be toggled using the net.core.bpf_jit_enable sysctl.</span></div>
<h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Theoretical explanation</span></h2>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The </span><a href="https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/64-ia-32-architectures-optimization-manual.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline;">Intel Optimization Reference Manual</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> says the following regarding Sandy Bridge (and later microarchitectural revisions) in section 2.3.2.3 ("Branch Prediction"):</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 36pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Branch prediction predicts the branch target and enables the</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 36pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">processor to begin executing instructions long before the branch</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 36pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">true execution path is known.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">In section 2.3.5.2 ("L1 DCache"):</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 36pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Loads can:</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 36pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">[...]</span></div>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; margin-left: 36pt; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Be carried out speculatively, before preceding branches are resolved.</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; margin-left: 36pt; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Take cache misses out of order and in an overlapped manner.</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Intel's Software Developer's Manual</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> [7] states in Volume 3A, section 11.7 ("Implicit Caching (Pentium 4, Intel Xeon, and P6 family processors"):</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 36pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Implicit caching occurs when a memory element is made potentially cacheable, although the element may never have been accessed in the normal von Neumann sequence. Implicit caching occurs on the P6 and more recent processor families due to aggressive prefetching, branch prediction, and TLB miss handling. Implicit caching is an extension of the behavior of existing Intel386, Intel486, and Pentium processor systems, since software running on these processor families also has not been able to deterministically predict the behavior of instruction prefetch.</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Consider the code sample below. If </span><span style="background-color: lime; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->length</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> is uncached, the processor can speculatively load data from </span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->data[untrusted_offset_from_caller]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">. This is an out-of-bounds read. That should not matter because the processor will effectively roll back the execution state when the branch has executed; none of the speculatively executed instructions will retire (e.g. cause registers etc. to be affected).</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">struct array {</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned long length;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned char data[];</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">};</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">struct array *arr1 = ...;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">unsigned long untrusted_offset_from_caller = ...;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">if (untrusted_offset_from_caller < </span><span style="background-color: lime; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->length</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">) {</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned char value = </span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->data[untrusted_offset_from_caller]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> ...</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">}</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">However, in the following code sample, there's an issue. If </span><span style="background-color: lime; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->length</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data[0x200]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> and </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data[0x300]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> are not cached, but all other accessed data is, and the branch conditions are predicted as true, the processor can do the following speculatively before </span><span style="background-color: lime; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->length</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> has been loaded and the execution is re-steered:</span></div>
<br>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">load </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">value = </span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->data[</span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">untrusted_offset_from_caller</span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">]</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">start a load from a data-dependent offset in </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, loading the corresponding cache line into the L1 cache</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">struct array {</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned long length;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned char data[];</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">};</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">struct array *arr1 = ...; /* small array */</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">struct array *arr2 = ...; /* array of size 0x400 */</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">/* >0x400 </span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 700; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">(OUT OF BOUNDS!)</span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> */</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">unsigned long untrusted_offset_from_caller = ...;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">if (</span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">untrusted_offset_from_caller</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> < </span><span style="background-color: lime; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->length</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">) {</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned char value = </span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->data[</span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">untrusted_offset_from_caller</span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned long index2 = ((value&1)*0x100)+0x200;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> if (index2 < arr2->length) {</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> unsigned char value2 = </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data[index2]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> }</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">}</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">After the execution has been returned to the non-speculative path because the processor has noticed that </span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">untrusted_offset_from_caller</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> is bigger than </span><span style="background-color: lime; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->length</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, the cache line containing </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data[index2]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> stays in the L1 cache. By measuring the time required to load </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data[0x200]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> and </span><span style="background-color: #4a86e8; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr2->data[0x300]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, an attacker can then determine whether the value of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">index2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> during speculative execution was 0x200 or 0x300 - which discloses whether </span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">arr1->data[</span><span style="background-color: #f6b26b; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">untrusted_offset_from_caller</span><span style="background-color: cyan; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">&1</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> is 0 or 1.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">To be able to actually use this behavior for an attack, an attacker needs to be able to cause the execution of such a vulnerable code pattern in the targeted context with an out-of-bounds index. For this, the vulnerable code pattern must either be present in existing code, or there must be an interpreter or JIT engine that can be used to generate the vulnerable code pattern. So far, we have not actually identified any existing, exploitable instances of the vulnerable code pattern; the PoC for leaking kernel memory using variant 1 uses the eBPF interpreter or the eBPF JIT engine, which are built into the kernel and accessible to normal users.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A minor variant of this could be to instead use an out-of-bounds read to a function pointer to gain control of execution in the mis-speculated path. We did not investigate this variant further.</span></div>
<h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Attacking the kernel</span></h2>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This section describes in more detail how variant 1 can be used to leak Linux kernel memory using the eBPF bytecode interpreter and JIT engine. While there are many interesting potential targets for variant 1 attacks, we chose to attack the Linux in-kernel eBPF JIT/interpreter because it provides more control to the attacker than most other JITs.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The Linux kernel supports eBPF since version 3.18. Unprivileged userspace code can supply bytecode to the kernel that is verified by the kernel and then:</span></div>
<br>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">either interpreted by an in-kernel bytecode interpreter</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">or translated to native machine code that also runs in kernel context using a JIT engine (which translates individual bytecode instructions without performing any further optimizations)</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Execution of the bytecode can be triggered by attaching the eBPF bytecode to a socket as a filter and then sending data through the other end of the socket.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Whether the JIT engine is enabled depends on a run-time configuration setting - but at least on the tested Intel processor, the attack works independent of that setting.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Unlike classic BPF, eBPF has data types like data arrays and function pointer arrays into which eBPF bytecode can index. Therefore, it is possible to create the code pattern described above in the kernel using eBPF bytecode.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">eBPF's data arrays are less efficient than its function pointer arrays, so the attack will use the latter where possible.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Both machines on which this was tested have no SMAP, and the PoC relies on that (but it shouldn't be a precondition in principle).</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Additionally, at least on the Intel machine on which this was tested, bouncing modified cache lines between cores is slow, apparently because the MESI protocol is used for cache coherence [8]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">. Changing the reference counter of an eBPF array on one physical CPU core causes the cache line containing the reference counter to be bounced over to that CPU core, making reads of the reference counter on all other CPU cores slow until the changed reference counter has been written back to memory. Because the length and the reference counter of an eBPF array are stored in the same cache line, this also means that changing the reference counter on one physical CPU core causes reads of the eBPF array's length to be slow on other physical CPU cores (intentional false sharing).</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The attack uses two eBPF programs. The first one tail-calls through a page-aligned eBPF function pointer array </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> at a configurable index. In simplified terms, this program is used to determine the address of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> by guessing the offset from </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> to a userspace address and tail-calling through </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> at the guessed offsets. To cause the branch prediction to predict that the offset is below the length of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, tail calls to an in-bounds index are performed in between. To increase the mis-speculation window, the cache line containing the length of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> is bounced to another core. To test whether an offset guess was successful, it can be tested whether the userspace address has been loaded into the cache.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Because such straightforward brute-force guessing of the address would be slow, the following optimization is used: 2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 6.6pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: super;">15</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> adjacent userspace memory mappings [9]</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, each consisting of 2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 6.6pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: super;">4</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> pages, are created at the userspace address </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">user_mapping_area</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, covering a total area of 2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 6.6pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: super;">31</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> bytes. Each mapping maps the same physical pages, and all mappings are present in the pagetables.</span></div>
<br>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-64YRnkgMujY/Wk064WtrSRI/AAAAAAAACPg/O4ZxlUiWerACL61P490xrVMWSmHTwQflQCEwYBhgL/s1600/image3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="138" data-original-width="624" height="139" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/image3.png" width="640"></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"></span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This permits the attack to be carried out in steps of 2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 6.6pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: super;">31</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> bytes. For each step, after causing an out-of-bounds access through </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">, only one cache line each from the first 2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 6.6pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: super;">4</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> pages of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">user_mapping_area</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> have to be tested for cached memory. Because the L3 cache is physically indexed, any access to a virtual address mapping a physical page will cause all other virtual addresses mapping the same physical page to become cached as well.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">When this attack finds a hit—a cached memory location—the upper 33 bits of the kernel address are known (because they can be derived from the address guess at which the hit occurred), and the low 16 bits of the address are also known (from the offset inside </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">user_mapping_area</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> at which the hit was found). The remaining part of the address of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">user_mapping_area</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> is the middle.</span></div>
<br>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-kSdcfy3GVSw/Wk065qWZZaI/AAAAAAAACPs/7HRZEXij3rIqvAf4gq8QpyHKvJsT2pYIQCEwYBhgL/s1600/image5.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="149" data-original-width="624" height="152" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/image5.png" width="640"></a></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"></span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The remaining bits in the middle can be determined by bisecting the remaining address space: Map two physical pages to adjacent ranges of virtual addresses, each virtual address range the size of half of the remaining search space, then determine the remaining address bit-wise.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">At this point, a second eBPF program can be used to actually leak data. In pseudocode, this program looks as follows:</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">uint64_t bitmask = <runtime-configurable>;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">uint64_t bitshift_selector = <runtime-configurable>;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">uint64_t prog_array_base_offset = <runtime-configurable>;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">uint64_t secret_data_offset = <runtime-configurable>;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">// index will be bounds-checked by the runtime,</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">// but the bounds check will be bypassed speculatively</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">uint64_t secret_data = bpf_map_read(array=victim_array, index=secret_data_offset);</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">// select a single bit, move it to a specific position, and add the base offset</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">uint64_t progmap_index = (((secret_data & bitmask) >> bitshift_selector) << 7) + prog_array_base_offset;</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 9pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">bpf_tail_call(prog_map, progmap_index);</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This program reads 8-byte-aligned 64-bit values from an eBPF data array "</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">victim_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">" at a runtime-configurable offset and bitmasks and bit-shifts the value so that one bit is mapped to one of two values that are 2</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 6.6pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: super;">7</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> bytes apart (sufficient to not land in the same or adjacent cache lines when used as an array index). Finally it adds a 64-bit offset, then uses the resulting value as an offset into </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> for a tail call.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This program can then be used to leak memory by repeatedly calling the eBPF program with an out-of-bounds offset into </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">victim_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> that specifies the data to leak and an out-of-bounds offset into </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> that causes </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">prog_map + offset</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> to point to a userspace memory area. Misleading the branch prediction and bouncing the cache lines works the same way as for the first eBPF program, except that now, the cache line holding the length of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "courier new"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">victim_map</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"> must also be bounced to another core.</span></div>
<h1 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 20pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 20pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Variant 2: Branch target injection</span></h1>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This section describes the theory behind our PoC for variant 2 that, when running with root privileges inside a KVM guest created using virt-manager on the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, with a specific version of Debian's distro kernel running on the host, can read host kernel memory at a rate of around 1500 bytes/second.</span></div>
<h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Basics</span></h2>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Prior research (see the Literature section at the end) has shown that it is possible for code in separate security contexts to influence each other's branch prediction. So far, this has only been used to infer information about where code is located (in other words, to create interference from the victim to the attacker); however, the basic hypothesis of this attack variant is that it can also be used to redirect execution of code in the victim context (in other words, to create interference from the attacker to the victim; the other way around).</span></div>
<br>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/image2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="200" data-original-width="278" src="./Project Zero_ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel_files/image2.png"></a></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"></span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The basic idea for the attack is to target victim code that contains an indirect branch whose target address is loaded from memory and flush the cache line containing the target address out to main memory. Then, when the CPU reaches the indirect branch, it won't know the true destination of the jump, and it won't be able to calculate the true destination until it has finished loading the cache line back into the CPU, which takes a few hundred cycles. Therefore, there is a time window of typically over 100 cycles in which the CPU will speculatively execute instructions based on branch prediction.</span></div>
<h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Haswell branch prediction internals</span></h2>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Some of the internals of the branch prediction implemented by Intel's processors have already been published; however, getting this attack to work properly required significant further experimentation to determine additional details.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">This section focuses on the branch prediction internals that were experimentally derived from the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Haswell seems to have multiple branch prediction mechanisms that work very differently:</span></div>
<br>
<ul style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A generic branch predictor that can only store one target per source address; used for all kinds of jumps, like absolute jumps, relative jumps and so on.</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">A specialized indirect call predictor that can store multiple targets per source address; used for indirect calls.</span></div>
</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; list-style-type: disc; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">(There is also a specialized return predictor, according to Intel's optimization manual, but we haven't analyzed that in detail yet. If this predictor could be used to reliably dump out some of the call stack through which a VM was entered, that would be very interesting.)</span></div>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 4pt; margin-top: 16pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 13.999999999999998pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Generic predictor</span></h3>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">The generic branch predictor, as documented in prior research, only uses the lower 31 bits of the address of the last byte of the source instruction for its prediction. If, for example, a branch target buffer (BTB) entry exists for a jump from 0x4141.0004.1000 to 0x4141.0004.5123, the generic predictor will also use it to predict a jump from 0x4242.0004.1000. When the higher bits of the source address differ like this, the higher bits of the predicted destination change together with it—in this case, the predicted destination address will be 0x4242.0004.5123—so apparently this predictor doesn't store the full, absolute destination address.</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">Before the lower 31 bits of the source address are used to look up a BTB entry, they are folded together using XOR. Specifically, the following bits are folded together:</span></div>
<br>
<div dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;">
<table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; width: 468pt;"><colgroup><col width="*"><col width="*"></colgroup><tbody>
<tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #000000 1pt; border-left: solid #000000 1pt; border-right: solid #000000 1pt; border-top: solid #000000 1pt; padding: 5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">bit A</span></div>
</td><td style="border-bottom: solid #000000 1pt; border-left: solid #000000 1pt; border-right: solid #000000 1pt; border-top: solid #000000 1pt; padding: 5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">bit B</span></div>
</td></tr>
<tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #000000 1pt; border-left: solid #000000 1pt; border-right: solid #000000 1pt; border-top: solid #000000 1pt; padding: 5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">0x40.0000</span></div>
</td><td style="border-bottom: solid #000000 1pt; border-left: solid #000000 1pt; border-right: solid #000000 1pt; border-top: solid #000000 1pt; padding: 5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">0x2000</span></div>
</td></tr>
<tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #000000 1pt; border-left: solid #000000 1pt; border-right: solid #000000 1pt; border-top: solid #000000 1pt; padding: 5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">0x80.0000</span></div>
</td><td style="border-bottom: solid #000000 1pt; border-left: solid #000000 1pt; border-right: solid #000000 1pt; border-top: solid #000000 1pt; padding: 5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">0x4000</span></div>
</td></tr>